Chapter 10 · U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Fort Lauderdale

Two bankruptcies for 2045 SW 127th Avenue, LLC

The property’s company filed Chapter 11 in 2024 and again in 2025; the first case was dismissed without discharge and the second was converted to Chapter 7.

The Ryan Burke Public Record · Updated November 11, 2026 · How this record was compiled

2045 SW 127th Avenue, LLC, the company associated with the litigated Davie property, was the debtor in two bankruptcy cases in the Southern District of Florida. The first, 24-14947-PDR, was dismissed in July 2024 without discharging any debts. The second, 25-14362-SMG, began in April 2025 under Chapter 11 and was converted to Chapter 7 that September. These are company bankruptcies, not petitions filed by Ryan Burke personally.¹²³⁴

The first case: May to July 2024

The public docket reproduction for 24-14947-PDR gives May 21, 2024 as the filing date and identifies a voluntary Chapter 11 case before Judge Peter D. Russin in the Fort Lauderdale Division. It names Barry S. Mittelberg as debtor counsel. The reproduced caption is “2045 SW 127 Avenue, LLC,” without “th.” The supplied dismissal and notice package uses that company name in its notice certificate and the same case number throughout.¹²

The petition itself is not among the supplied primary filings. The public reproduction establishes the filing date and docket activity, but it does not reveal the petition’s company signatory or the complete schedules of assets and liabilities. A June 26 entry referring to “Schedules and Statements Filed” establishes that such documents were docketed; it is not evidence of their financial totals. This chapter does not import the second case’s later estimates into the first case.¹

The U.S. Trustee filed an expedited motion to convert the case to Chapter 7 or appoint a Chapter 11 trustee, identified in the dismissal order as D.E. 10. Judge Russin heard the matter July 11, 2024. According to the signed order, the debtor had no objection to dismissal and the U.S. Trustee did not oppose that relief. The court reviewed the record, motion and hearing statements and determined that dismissal was in the best interests of creditors and the estate.²

The underlying motion and July 11 hearing transcript are not supplied. The dismissal order proves the motion’s existence, requested alternatives and disposition. It does not set out the motion’s complete allegations. It would be inaccurate to describe the order as a finding that Burke personally committed bankruptcy fraud, or to attribute a particular statutory ground for dismissal beyond what the order states.²

The contempt order filed as an attachment

The bankruptcy file contains a copy of the May 13, 2024 state-court contempt order in Kameka and Dzotsi’s separate Broward case, CACE-22-001852. Its federal filing header identifies it as Doc. 10-1 in 24-14947-PDR, filed May 24, 2024. The state order preceded the company’s May 21 bankruptcy filing; its inclusion in the bankruptcy docket followed that filing. Those dates establish a sequence, not the company’s motive for its first petition.⁵¹

Judge William Haury Jr.’s signed order found that Burke lied in his affidavit, deposition and open-court testimony concerning his claimed presence in Las Vegas on April 11, 2022. It adjudged indirect criminal contempt for the affidavit and deposition and direct criminal contempt for his in-court testimony “due to his perjury.” It ordered three consecutive days in the Broward County jail, to be served between May 15 and July 15, 2024. That adjudication was made by a civil judge in the state civil case, not by the bankruptcy court.⁵

Burke’s earlier position was that he had been in Las Vegas and had not been served on April 11. The state court later rejected that account in the contempt order. The underlying service litigation and his explanations are addressed in the Kameka/Dzotsi chapter. The records reviewed do not establish whether the jail term was served, appealed or later modified. Nothing in the company’s bankruptcy-dismissal order resolves those questions.⁵⁶²

Dismissal was entered July 16, not July 17

Judge Russin signed the dismissal order July 15, 2024. The docket reproduction records its entry on July 16 as Doc. 39. Kameka and Dzotsi filed a notice attaching that order in their state action on July 17. The federal certificate of notice, Doc. 40, was filed July 18 and reproduces the same dismissal order. July 17 is therefore the state notice date, not the date the federal court dismissed the company case.²¹⁷

The order denied unresolved motions as moot and canceled remaining meetings, hearings or scheduling conferences. It required outstanding operating reports and assessed fees within 21 days of entry. It required professional compensation applications within 14 days and permitted the clerk to close the case after the relevant application period or adjudication. These were continuing administrative requirements after dismissal, not a confirmed repayment plan or a discharge.²

The public docket reproduction records “Bankruptcy Case Closed” on August 22, 2024, Doc. 43. That later closure is distinct from dismissal on July 16. The supplied signed order authorizes eventual closure; the reproduction supplies the closing entry. Neither event shows that creditors were paid, and the dismissal order expressly says obligations were not discharged.¹²

There is a caption discrepancy in the package. The notice certificate names the 2045 company, but the attached dismissal order says “2034 SW 127 Avenue, L.L.C.” The matching case number, certificate and state attachment link the package to the 2045 company. This chapter treats “2034” as the caption typo apparent in that package while preserving the discrepancy. No explanatory correction order was reviewed.²⁷

Creditors and notice recipients

The dismissal certificate includes both identified creditors and recipients of bankruptcy notices. Its CM/ECF list expressly describes Gaudioso as counsel for creditors Kameka and Dzotsi, Rachamin Cohen as counsel for creditor Genuine Investments Land Trust, and Scott Andron as counsel for creditor Broward County. Mittelberg is identified for the debtor, while J. Steven Wilkes and Martin P. Ochs appear for the Office of the U.S. Trustee.²

The distinction is consequential. Notice to the IRS or Florida Department of Revenue is not proof of a tax judgment against Burke or the company. The Spotlite Images entry does not prove a judgment for unpaid photography services, identify the underlying transaction or state an amount. Those propositions would require a proof of claim, complaint, judgment or another transaction-specific record.²

The certificate also records duplicate and undeliverable-address notations. Those are administrative descriptions of notice processing. They are not findings of evasion, refusal to accept service or misconduct by the named creditor or debtor. No personal addresses or contact details from the certificate are reproduced here.²

The second case: April 21, 2025

The company’s May 2, 2025 Chapter 11 case-management summary states that the second voluntary filing occurred April 21, 2025. The public docket reproduction agrees with that date and identifies Judge Scott M. Grossman. The company again described its business as real-estate investment and identified ownership of 2045 SW 127th Avenue, Davie, Florida 33325 as its operations.³⁸

The summary identifies “Ryan Burke, Manager and sole shareholder.” Its signature is for the debtor through Burke Development Group, LLC as manager, with Burke described as manager of Burke Development Group. Mark S. Roher appears as proposed debtor counsel. Those statements explain Burke’s representative role in this filing. They do not convert the LLC’s petition into his individual bankruptcy or make every company claim his personal debt.³

The summary qualifies its information as “approximations for background information only” and possible best estimates. It is a signed debtor submission, not sworn deposition testimony or a court valuation. Its purpose and financial entries are accordingly reported as the debtor’s position.³

Income, assets and debts in the May 2 summary

The summary’s income question asks for year-to-date gross income and gross income for the preceding year. The answers are “Income for 2024 - $21,000.00” and “Income for 2025 - $28,000.00.” The document does not describe the 2025 amount as a monthly rate or a completed full-year result. This chapter reports the figures with their stated years and does not annualize them or attribute them to Burke’s personal earnings.³

The company also reported no employees or wages owed and no anticipated emergency relief within 14 days. The summary attached an Evanston general-liability insurance binder, but the binder expressly describes temporary coverage for twelve days subject to application and payment requirements. Its attachment is not proof that insurance remained in force throughout the listed June 2024–June 2025 period. No lapse or resulting sanction is established merely by that limitation.³

The $2.9 million estimate is not a later foreclosure-sale price. The $962,000 lender entry matches the note principal identified in the July 2026 state judgment, not the judgment’s larger total after interest, fees and credits. The company summary and the state judgment address different dates and different measures. The foreclosure chapter sets out the judgment’s components and the limits on any claim about present balances.³⁹

Claim 4 by Kameka and Dzotsi

Kameka and Dzotsi filed joint Proof of Claim 4 on May 21, 2025, asserting $178,415.77 for “Money loaned.” They divided it into $131,104.73 secured by a recorded judgment lien and $47,311.04 unsecured. Their claim also listed a $2.9 million property value. The claim is signed under penalty of perjury, but it remains the creditors’ claim, not a supplied order allowing the full amount.¹⁰

The secured figure is the $107,212 historical equitable-lien judgment plus $23,892.73 in claimed interest. The unsecured figure is $42,835 in additional fees plus $4,476.04 in claimed costs. The package attaches the July 12, 2022 amended default judgment, interest entries, an additional-fee motion, counsel’s declaration and billing materials. The judgment is a court record within the attachment; the request for additional compensation remains a party submission.¹⁰

These entries differ from the debtor’s earlier $107,212 Kameka estimate and statement that unsecured claims were “none.” Claimed accrued interest and additional fees explain part of the difference in what the parties reported. The reviewed materials contain no Claim 4 allowance order resolving the entire amount or classification. They also do not provide the complete written orders reconciling the historical state judgment with the later service and contempt proceedings.³¹⁰

One arithmetic detail remains unexplained: the attached expense sheet totals $4,118.04, while the declaration and request state $4,476.04 in costs, a $358 difference. This is a comparison of printed amounts, not a finding of improper billing or a correction to an allowed claim. The claim package does not explain it.¹⁰

Conversion in September 2025

Judge Grossman heard two motions September 3, 2025: the U.S. Trustee’s motion to convert or dismiss, ECF 38, and Kameka and Dzotsi’s motion to convert, ECF 36. He signed the conversion order September 9; it was entered September 10 as Doc. 47. The public reproduction’s conversion-date field uses September 9. Reporting both signature and entry dates avoids treating that field as a different ruling.⁴⁸

The court determined conversion appropriate under 11 U.S.C. section 1112(b) “for the reasons stated on the record” at the September 3 hearing. Neither the hearing transcript nor the two motions is supplied. The order does not itself set out findings of fraud, a contempt sentence or a fine. The fact of conversion should not be expanded into an unsupported account of why the court chose it.⁴

The order required the debtor to turn over estate records and property to the Chapter 7 trustee. It also required an accounting of receipts and distributions within 30 days and schedules of unpaid post-petition debts and other required information within 14 days. Professional compensation applications and creditor notices were addressed as well. These are affirmative administration duties, not evidence that all transfers or filings were completed.⁴

What dismissal and conversion mean here

The U.S. Courts’ Bankruptcy Basics guide explains that Chapter 11 generally provides for reorganization. A debtor ordinarily keeps control of its assets as a “debtor in possession” unless a trustee is appointed. The automatic stay generally suspends pre-petition collection and foreclosure actions against the debtor, subject to exceptions and court-ordered relief. Filing therefore can affect a property foreclosure without deciding the lender’s ultimate entitlement or paying the debt.¹¹

The same guide explains that a party may seek dismissal or conversion for cause, with the choice generally governed by creditors’ and the estate’s best interests. Dismissal ends the bankruptcy proceeding rather than changing it into Chapter 7 administration. In the first company case, the operative consequences were explicit: no discharge and termination of any automatic stay. That order did not cancel the underlying state claims.¹¹²

Conversion changes the existing case to another chapter. Chapter 7 provides for liquidation and distribution under a trustee’s administration, rather than continuing with the debtor in possession as under ordinary Chapter 11. The U.S. Courts guide also states that Chapter 7 discharge is available only to individuals, not corporations or partnerships. The second company’s conversion was not a personal “fresh start” for Burke, and no reviewed order grants him a discharge.¹²⁴

Three different trustee descriptions appear across these records. The Office of the U.S. Trustee sought dismissal or conversion as part of bankruptcy oversight. Kenneth A. Welt later acted as the Chapter 7 estate trustee. E&Y Assets acted as trustee of Genuine Investments Land Trust, the senior property-lien claimant. Those are different roles; the lender trust’s trustee is not the bankruptcy estate’s trustee.²⁴¹³⁹

The November 2, 2026 distribution order

The latest supplied bankruptcy order is Doc. 123, signed November 2, 2026 by Grossman as Chief Judge. It grants Welt’s request and permits the trustee to distribute $74.92 to the debtor’s representative. The operative paragraph spells that representative’s name “Ruyan Burke.” That spelling is preserved here rather than silently rewritten in a quotation.¹³

Permission to distribute is not evidence that the representative received the payment. The order does not disclose a foreclosure price, explain the source of the small residue or provide the history of payments to creditors. It cannot be used to infer that the property’s total value was $74.92 or that this was all money administered in the case.¹³

The public docket reproduction describes the preceding November 1 motion as seeking distribution of minimal funds “So Case Can Be Closed.” It shows the November 2 order but no later closing entry in the excerpt reviewed. An objective of closing the case is not a completed closure. The supplied order itself authorizes payment, not closure or discharge.⁸¹³

Combined timeline and foreclosure timing

The records establish specific foreclosure sale dates in February 2025 and August 2026. They do not identify a scheduled sale date corresponding to the first petition on May 21, 2024. The second company’s stated purpose was to stop a sale, but its May 2 summary does not give that sale’s date. This chapter therefore does not describe either bankruptcy as filed “the day before” a foreclosure sale.¹⁴⁹¹³

What remains unresolved

The reviewed records do not disclose the full first petition or schedules, its company signatory, the complete grounds in either U.S. Trustee motion, or the hearing reasons incorporated into the conversion order. They do not establish a sale date immediately following either petition, full allowance or recovery on Claim 4, the property’s eventual sale price, all creditor distributions, receipt of the authorized $74.92 or closure of the second case. The “2034” caption and “Ruyan” spelling have no supplied explanatory correction. Whether the jail term was served, appealed or later modified is also not established. None of these gaps supports treating the two company cases as Burke’s personal bankruptcies.^1243109135